Despite differences, the two countries continue to cooperate on counterterrorism and nonproliferation.
Large numbers of Jews, Poles, and Lithuanians emigrated to the United States from Russia between 1880 and 1917. Trade relations remained cordial.
Avoiding a direct military conflict with Russia remains the paramount U.S. goal, despite the threat of cyberattacks and other forms of covert interference.
The U.S.-Russia Relationship
The United States must recognize that Russia is not going away. The country has significant ambitions and capabilities, and it will insist on a seat at the table in dealing with most global crises and regional conflicts. Washington cannot ignore these realities nor adopt a confrontational posture that would escalate tensions and risk conflict.
Successive administrations have struggled to craft a sustainable policy toward Russia. Their efforts have largely followed a predictable pattern: a new administration enters office dissatisfied with the state of relations and pledges to do better, leading to a policy review and a “reset” aimed at developing a partnership.
Developing such a relationship requires realism, restraint, and active engagement with Moscow that emphasizes give-and-take and compromises rather than ultimatums. It will also require a clear understanding of how the Kremlin defines its national interests and views American attempts to project influence and values within Russia and around it. Moreover, it will require an appreciation of how the distribution of global power has shifted from a unipolar world centered on the United States to one that features Russia and other countries seeking to push back against American primacy in their surrounding regions.
The U.S.-Russia Security Relationship
The United States cannot afford to ignore Russia or embrace a confrontational posture that could escalate tensions and risk conflict. It can, however, build on past successes to rework its relationship with Moscow and achieve broad-based common interests.
This will require a new administration to rebuild a measure of trust and practice restraint in dealing with a range of issues where the U.S. and Russian national interests intersect. It will also require the United States to accept that differences over values will impact the quality of the relationship, but not dictate an end to cooperation or a reworking of alliances.
Managing these challenges will necessitate a commitment to continuous active management at the highest levels of policymaking, including personal involvement by the president. It will also require acknowledging that in many post-Soviet states, domestic obstacles (not Russian influence) have stymied or stalled progress toward democratic governance and free markets; rolling back Russian influence may not advance those goals.
The U.S.-Russia Economic Relationship
For a time after the Cold War, cooperation between Russia and the United States produced concrete accomplishments. During the Bush and Obama administrations, the two negotiated a new treaty to reduce strategic nuclear weapons, worked through German reunification, and cooperated on issues from Afghanistan to Iran.
But the two countries have different ends in mind for their neighborhood. The United States would like to see its former Soviet republics populated by democratic governments and free markets, integrated into Western economic and security institutions. Russia, by contrast, advocates a sphere of privileged interests in the region and sees democracy promotion as an attempt to subvert its control.
Until Washington and Moscow can work out ways to align their goals with one another, the quality of U.S.-Russia relations will continue to have major implications for global stability and the ability of the United States to advance its values and interests. Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program provides clear-eyed analysis of the relationship to help policymakers navigate these challenges.
The U.S.-Russia Cultural Relationship
Moscow views itself as part of a post-West world, and seeks to undermine norms that are central to the global order. In doing so, it relies on asymmetric tools to exploit fissures between the United States and its allies and to weaken faith in democratic and free-market governance.
Russia’s foreign policy aims to establish a sphere of influence, as demonstrated by its wars against Georgia and Ukraine. Moscow also seeks recognition of its right to intervene in regional crises, such as the current conflict in Syria.
Successive U.S. administrations have sought to reshape Russia in America’s image, but it is unrealistic to expect a productive relationship to emerge from a dynamic of competition and confrontation. Instead, Washington must learn to compartmentalize its bilateral problems with Russia from broader issues of shared interest. This will require realism, restraint and a willingness to engage in give-and-take rather than ultimatums. Moreover, it will require an acknowledgment that differences over values cannot be ignored, but that those should not shape the entire relationship.
